Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the bimatrix game using the robust optimization approach, in which each player may neither exactly estimate his opponent's strategies nor evaluate his own cost matrix accurately while he may estimate a bounded uncertain set. We obtain computationally tractable robust formulations which turn to be linear programming problems and then solving a robust optimization equilibrium can be converted to solving a mixed complementarity problem under the l 1 ∩ l∞-norm. Some numerical results are presented to illustrate the behavior of the robust optimization equilibrium.
Introduction
In [18] , [19] , Nash modeled each player as rational and wanting to maximize his expected payoff with respect to the probability distributions given by the mixed strategies. Moreover, Nash proved that each game of the aforementioned type has an equilibrium in mixed strategies. However, in real-world game-theoretic situations, players are often uncertain of some aspects of the structure of the game, such as payoff functions. Harsanyi [14] considered the case with uncertain payoff functions, an extension of Nash's framework, and modeled these incomplete information games as what was called "Bayesian" games. In that model, the uncertain payoffs were treated as expectation. Some contributions to the literature have relaxed the common prior and common knowledge assumptions of Harsanyi's model, for example, see [15] , [17] etc. Aghassi and Bertsimas in [1] proposed a distribution-free, robust optimization model for incomplete-information games. Using a worst-case approach to uncertainty, in the absence of probability distributions, [1] proved the existence of an equilibrium in robust finite games with bounded uncertain payoffs and no private information. At the same time, [1] provided an expression for equilibrium set when payoffs are bounded polyhedral uncertain.
Robust optimization is a technique for handling optimization problems with uncertain parameters, in which those uncertain parameters are assumed to belong to the so-called uncertain sets, and then the objective function is minimized (or maximized) by taking into account the worst possible case. Initial results on robust optimization were given by Soyster in [20] . Twenty years later, Ben-Tal and Nemirovski [2], [3], [4] and independently of them, El Ghaoui [9], [10] renewed the discussion of optimization under uncertainty. They investigated ellipsoidal models of uncertainty, which for the robust LP (linear programming) case are less conservative than the columnwise model proposed by Soyster in [20] . However, such a robust counterpart is more computationally demanding than that of the corresponding nominal problem. Bertsimas and Sim [6], [7] offered an alternative model of symmetric uncertainty, under which the robust counterpart is tractable preserving the computational complexity of the nominal problem. Subsequently, Chen et al. [8] refined the framework of [7] to asymmetric situations.
In our work, to capture the essence of the underlying random variables, we consider the robust optimization equilibrium for a bimatrix game from the cardinality of an asymmetrically uncertain set under the l 1 ∩ l ∞ -norm, in which each player attempts to minimize his own cost with either each player's own cost matrix or his opponent's uncertain strategies. In this situation, the model turns to be a bimatrix game: player one min 
